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FORTY YEARS AFTER ENACTMENT, IS THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
NECESSARY LEGISLATION OR GLOBAL
OVERREACH?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") of 1977 is a legislative
attempt to curtail corruption and bribery in international commerce.' As the
global economy becomes increasingly integrated, businesses are less likely
to be conducted in a uniform fashion.2 In response to the integration, the
United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") have been tasked with ensuring the integrity
of the financial markets.3 Former United States Attorney General Eric
Holder notes that because America is the world's largest democracy with the
world's strongest economy, it has a vested interest in combating bribery in

' See Crim. Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Just. & Enforcement Div. of U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign CorruptPracticesAct 2 (Nov. 14,
2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf
(explaining history of FCPA).
2 See JONATHAN M. KARPOFF, D. ScorT LEE & GERALD S. MARTIN, FOREIGN BRIBERY:
INCENTIVES
AND
ENFORCEMENT
4
(Apr.
7,
2017),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=1573222 (discussing impact of penalties for
business corruption that vary by country). Without legislation to enforce penalties,
[T]he revelation of bribery, by itself, has little long-term impact, as long as the bribery
is not comingled with charges of financial fraud. Because non-fraud firms face relatively
small costs even when they are caught bribing . .. the net benefits of their bribe-related
projects are non-negative (as long as the firm avoids comingled fraud charges).
Id. at 4.
See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Just., Address at the 24th
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010) available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101 116.html (last updated Sept. 17,
2014) (explaining value of FCPA enforcement). The FCPA is necessary for businesses:
FCPA enforcement is not bad for business; it is, instead, vital to ensuring the integrity
of our markets. Our FCPA enforcement program serves not only to hold accountable
those who corrupt foreign officials, but in doing so it also serves to make the international
business climate more transparent and fair for everyone. FCPA enforcement both roots
out foreign corruption and deters it from taking hold in the first place.
Id.
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international business transactions.' Such corruption weakens economic
development, undermines confidence in the marketplace, and distorts
competition.' Enforcement of the FCPA is necessary to ensure confidence
in financial and governmental institutions does not erode to levels last seen
under President Nixon.6
Following the Watergate scandal, when trust in the government was
at an all-time low, the SEC discovered that many public companies were
making illegal campaign contributions to United States' officials.' Ensuing
scandals involving payments by American companies to public officials in
Japan, Italy, and Mexico led to political repercussions abroad and negatively
impacted the American business community's reputation throughout the
world.! More than 400 firms, including 117 Fortune 500 firms, subsequently
disclosed illicit payments that exceeded $400 million.' To restore faith in
the ethics of American businesses, Congress amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and enacted the FCPA in 1977.0
The Carter administration was keen on improving American
businesses' reputation worldwide, and in 1979, Philip B. Heymann, the
Assistant Attorney General for DOJ's Criminal Division, laid out a guide for
how companies should interpret the new legislation: "where a company has
been making good faith efforts to monitor its employees, that will be relevant
in our decision how to proceed .... The most efficient means of

4 See List of Countries by Projected GDP, STATISTIC TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017),
http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp.php (providing economic data on
GDP).
5 See Eric Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the Organisation for
at
available
2010)
31,
(May
Development
and
Co-Operation
Economic
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorey-general-holder-delivers-remarks-organisationeconomic-co-operation-and (detailing economic effects of bribery on international business
conduct).
6 See id. (explaining how FCPA enforcement encourages confidence and competition in
economic markets).
7 See S. REP. No. 105-277, at 1-2 (1998) (detailing historical contributions made to officials).
8 See id. (noting business scandals involving various foreign countries and US companies); see
also Peter Pae, Ex-Lockheed Chief Told of Paying Bribes, LA TiMES (Dec. 21, 2008),
("A. Carl Kotchian, the former
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/21/local/me-kotchian2l
president of Lockheed Aircraft Corp, whose admission to paying millions of dollars in bribes to
foreign government officials led to the imprisonment of Japan's prime minister and political
upheaval in several countries in the 1970s ....").
9 See A. Michael Stevens, Asian Development Bank: Action to Identify Risks in the Bidding
Process to Prevent Corruption, FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND PROMOTING INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT 195, 196 (OECD Publishing 2005) (detailing extent of American business
corruption in 1970s).
'0 See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1-2 (1998) (outlining legislative history of Securities Exchange
Act and FCPA).
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implementing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is voluntary compliance by
the American business community."" Enforcement of the FCPA has largely
mirrored these comments by Heymann.1 2 The threat of prosecution for
corruption has created dialogue among companies on the most effective
ways to implement procedures to stay within the bounds of the law." This
Note examines the statutory framework of the FCPA as well as the manner
in which the law has been enforced.
II.

FACTS

The FCPA prohibits any issuer from making payments to foreign
officials or foreign political parties to obtain or retain business.14 Primarily,
the FCPA relies on two main prongs to enforce this prohibition; the antibribery and accounting provisions." The first prong identifies that giving or
offering anything of value to foreign officials for the purposes of retaining
or obtaining business is illegal.' 6 The second prong of the FCPA arsenal is
a powerful accounting provision; its "books and records" portion requires
issuers,'" employees, and agents to maintain accurate accounting records
that "fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the issuer."" In

1 See Philip Urofsky, Hee Won Moon & Jennifer Rimm, How Should We Measure the
Effectiveness of the ForeignCorruptPracticesAct? Don't Break What Isn't Broken-The Fallacies
ofReform, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1145, 1147 (2012) (outlining government's approach to implementing
FCPA).
12 See id. (noting enforcement of FCPA has been largely consistent with Heymann's
comments).
13 See id. ("[T]he risk of government enforcement has spurred a public/private regime of 'soft'
enforcement ....
The corporate community's overall commitment to this internal compliance
regime is the best measure of the FCPA's effectiveness.").
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2010) (outlining prohibited foreign trade practices due to
domestic concerns).
1s See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2010) (detailing accounting provisions designed to operate in
tandem with anti-bribery aspects of FCPA).
16 See Crim. Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Just. & Enforcement Div. of U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, supra note 1, at 10-11 (detailing coverage of anti-bribery provisions). The
anti-bribery provision receives substantial latitude in the scope of its application and impacts all
issuers, domestic concerns, and certain persons acting while in American territory. Id This
provision extends to any of the "[o]fficers, directors, employees, agents or stockholders" of issuers
and domestic concerns. Id at 11.
" See id at 11 ("A company is an 'issuer' under the FCPA if it has a class of securities
registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act or is required to file ... reports with SEC under
Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.")
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78m-(b)(2)(A) (outlining books and records provisions of statute). See
generallyCrim. Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Just. & Enforcement Div. of U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, supra note 1, at 38 (detailing accounting provisions of FCPA).
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tandem with the books and records provision, the accounting prong of the
FCPA also requires that issuers:
[D]evise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that(i) transactions are executed in accordance with
authorization; (ii) transactions are
management's . .
recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial
statements in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such
statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization; and (iv) the
recorded accountability for assets is compared with existing
assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken
with respect to any differences."
The accounting prong is particularly potent because an improper
record or defective control mechanism constitutes a violation of the statute
even in the absence of a bribe.20 Moreover, the statute allows prosecutors to
sidestep the bribery provision altogether by utilizing the accounting
provision to charge bribery violations.21 This is a highly viable option,
especially when the bribery provision elements cannot be fully proven, or as
a part of a compromise towards settlement and avoidance of criminal
liability.22 Given the expansive avenues of liability through this second
prong, companies are more likely to find themselves facing an accounting
charge rather than a bribery enforcement action.23
9 15 U.S.C. § 78m-(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) (discussing books, records, and internal accounting
prong). The Department of Justice has restated the "internal control" requirement by mandating
issuers must "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient" to assure
management's control, authority, and responsibility over the firm's assets. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
20 See Daniel J. Grimm, Traversing the Minefield: Joint Ventures and the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 91, 95 (2014) ("[T]he FCPA's expansive books and records
and internal control provisions can ensnare a corporate issuer despite the absence of an improper
payment or the involvement of a foreign official.").
21 See 2016 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CLUTCHER LLP (July 5, 2016)
(providing
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2016-Mid-Year-FCPA-Update.aspx
overview of FCPA structure).
22 See id. (explaining broad reach of accounting provision).
23

See JONATHAN M. KARPOFF, D. Scorr LEE & GERALD S. MARTIN, THE ECONOMICS OF

2014),
6 (Jan. 23,
ACTIONS
FCPA
FROM
EVIDENCE
BRIBERY:
http://www.fmiaconferences.org/Tokyo/Papers/JonathanKarpoff.pdf (noting the provisions do not
always work in concert).
FOREIGN
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A potential violation invites thorough scrutiny by government
agencies, along with substantial penalties.24 As both the DOJ and SEC
enforce the FCPA, prosecutors enjoy a powerful selection of criminal and
civil penalties.25 The DOJ controls all criminal enforcement of the FCPA
along with certain civil enforcement powers, while the SEC prosecutes civil
lawsuits regarding issuers for both anti-bribery and accounting violations.2 6
Specifically, "most enforcement of the accounting provisions has been
through civil actions filed by the SEC."27
Non-compliance with the FCPA often results in significant financial
ramifications for companies and stockholders." For instance, stockholders
will see a company's share value erode when faced with even the prospect
of a FCPA investigation.29 A study using econometrics to analyze the effects
on share price from news that a firm is being investigated for FCPA bribery
violations found that it "triggers a significant reduction in share value. The
loss.... is much larger when the bribery violation is comingled with

24

See id. at 16 (detailing severity of penalties).

25 See id. at 2 (outlining multitude of prosecutorial options for penalties for FCPA violations).
26 See Mike Koehler, The ForeignCorrupt PracticesAct in the Ultimate Year ofIts Decade
of
Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 395-96 (2010) (discussing different areas of enforcement
between DOJ and SEC). Issuers can face a multitude of enforcement actions for improper
payments:

Because improper payments that violate the FCPA's antibribery provisions are also often
disguised or inaccurately recorded on the company's books and records, many FCPA
enforcement actions against Issuers include parallel DOJ and SEC enforcement actions
for both antibribery violations and books and records violations. Further, internal control
violations are often also pursued in connection with antibribery and books and records
violations on the theory that effective internal controls would have prevented the
improper payments and improper recording of the payments. Thus, as to Issuers, the
FCPA is often a three-headed monster when improper payments are made.
Id at 396.
27 See Sarah Bartle, Chris Chamberlain & Brian Wohlberg, Foreign CorruptPractices
Act, 51
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1265,1269-73 (2014) (providing overview of accounting provision enforcement
actions brought by SEC and DOJ).
28 See 63 PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPER, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: WHAT YOU
DON'T KNow COULD COST YOU, at 3-4 (2011), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/private-companyservices/publications/assets/gyb-63-foreign-corrupt-practices-act.pdf (describing FCPA's impact
on public and private companies).
29 See Tomi Kilgore, Cognizant's potential FCPA violations makes stock 'umivestable' to many
investors-analyst,
MARKET
WATCH
(Sept.
30,
2016,
3:47
PM),
http//www.marketwatchcom/story/cognizants-potential-fcpa-violations-makes-stock-iivestable-to-manyinvestors-analyst-2016-09-30 ("While the stock's valuation remains 'attractive,' given the
information technology consulting company's fundamental strength, 'we also recognize that the
stock is likely "uninvestable" to many investors now due to the combination of near-term factors
that serve as an overhang. . . .' The stock had tumbled 21% year to date.").
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financial fraud charges."30 According to the study, share values plummet by
an average of 33.06% upon public disclosure of FCPA enforcement actions
The adverse impact on shareholders is
involving fraud charges. 31
three out of four bribery actions include
that
nearly
exacerbated by the fact
books and records as well as internal provisions' violations.32 When faced
with the prospect of their investment going into a tailspin, shareholders often
call for legal recourse against management and the board of directors for
failing to comply with the FCPA and inviting potentially crippling liability.33
Under the Obama administration, anti-bribery enforcement was a
priority for United States law enforcement agencies, with a substantial
increase in actions since 2007.34 In fact, on April 6, 2016, the DOJ launched
a one-year pilot program that provided incentives to companies that
The three main
cooperated and self-reported FCPA violations."
requirements of the program are: (i) voluntary self-disclosure of all FCPA
violations, (ii) full cooperation with the DOJ, and (iii) timely and appropriate

30 See Karpoff ET AL., supra note 23, at 17 (detailing adverse impact of contemporaneous
violations on return values).
31 See id. (outlining empirical framework for study).
32 See id. at 14 ("[V]iolations of the FCPA's books and records ... and internal controls ...
provisions are included in 110 and 102 of the 143 bribery-related actions, respectively.").
33 See Howard B. Epstein & Theodore A. Keyes, Are Private Companies' Liability Risks
Adequately
Insure?,
251
NEW
YORK
L.
J.
(Mar.
4
2014),
https://www.srz.com/images/content/6/8/v2/68768/New-York-Law-Journal-Are-PrivateCompanies-Liability-Risks-Adequ.pdf ("The Towers Watson survey confirms that surveyed
directors and officers have expressed increased concern over regulatory claims, with 83 percent of
respondents ranking regulatory claims as a top three risk of concern.").
34 See Marc Alain Bohn & Michael Skopets, Uptick in FCPA EnforcementSuggests 2015 Drop
Was Outlier, LAw360 (May 18, 2016, 11:25 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/795489/uptickin-fcpa-enforcement-suggests-2015-drop-was-outlier?article relatedcontent-1 ("After a relative
slowdown in 2015, the pace of enforcement activity under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has
increased sharply in 2016, resulting in a record 15 first-quarter enforcement actions and 17 year to
date.").
3s See Andrew Weissman, U.S. Dep't. of Just., Criminal Division, The Fraud Section's
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386/download (providing details of Pilot
Program). The Pilot Program's objectives are:
[by] adding additional
We aim to accomplish this goal of greater accountability ...
agents and prosecutors to investigate criminal activity, and enhancing our cooperation
And we also aim to
with foreign law enforcement authorities where possible.
accomplish the same goal by providing greater transparency about what we require from
companies seeking mitigation credit for voluntarily self-disclosing misconduct, fully
cooperating with an investigation, and remediating, and what sort of credit those
companies can receive if they do so consistent with these requirements.
Id. at 2.
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mediation efforts.3 6 If a company follows these three conditions, the Fraud
Section's FCPA Unit "may accord up to a 50% reduction off the bottom end
of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range, if a fine is sought; and... .generally
should not require appointment of a monitor." 37 Furthermore, the Fraud Unit
"will consider a declination of prosecution."38
With newfound emphasis on enforcement actions and increased
resources, the SEC brought more FCPA enforcement actions in the first six
months of 2016 than in any full year since 2011.39 China, in particular, has
become a frequent target of FCPA enforcement.4 0 As the economy becomes
more interconnected and globalized, a transformation in the manner in which
business is conducted is inevitable.4 1 While highly sophisticated entities can
mitigate the change by retaining a bevy of counselors with expertise in such
matters, smaller corporations and plaintiffs with more modest resources may

36 See id at 4-8 (providing in-depth review of three main requirements to FCPA attorneys on
compliance with pilot program).
37 See id at 8-9 (footnote omitted) (outlining options of Fraud Section's FCPA Unit for
prosecuting violations).
38 See id at 9 (detailing mitigating factors FCPA Unit faces when considering declining
prosecutorial action). The FCPA Unit must decide when a criminal resolution would be warranted:

Of course, in considering whether declination may be warranted, Fraud Section
prosecutors must also take into account countervailing interests, including the
seriousness of the offense: in cases where, for example, there has been involvement by
executive management of the company in the FCPA misconduct, a significant profit to
the company from the misconduct in relation to the company's size and wealth, a history
of non-compliance by the company, or a prior resolution by the company with the
Department within the past five years, a criminal resolution likely would be warranted.
Id.
39 See 2016 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DuNN & CLUTCHER LLP (Jan. 3, 2017),
2
(providing
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/ 016-Year-End-FCPA-Update.aspx
overview of increased enforcement actions under FCPA in 2016). 2016 was an active year for the
DOJ and SEC:
The 53 FCPA enforcement actions filed by DOJ and the SEC in 2016 trails only 2010 ...
for the most enforcement actions in the 39-year history of the statute. The SEC, in
particular, set an agency record with 32 FCPA enforcement actions. But it is not just
that there were many FCPA enforcement actions in 2016; it is that there were many
significant FCPA enforcement actions, including five with corporate financial penalties
eclipsing the $100 million mark.
Id.
40 See id. (detailing Chinese companies' involvement in roughly half of the new enforcement
actions).
41 See id. (noting new FCPA actions in various countries throughout the world).
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find themselves short-changed.42 The FCPA is an effort to even the playing
field by removing some unfair advantages held by large corporations, while
also blending global business standards.4 3
This Note begins by examining the possibility of private right of
action for injured individuals, attempting to explicate the FCPA's necessity
by demonstrating a general lack of protection for shareholders." Next, it
will explore the impact of globalization on economics, delving more deeply
into American business relations with China.45 In conclusion, the author will
attempt to predict potential enforcement of the FCPA under President
Donald Trump's guidance.46
III. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION AND THE FCPA
Unfortunately for shareholders and other private plaintiffs, courts
have specifically ruled out a private right of action in the FCPA.47
Commentators point to both the United Nations Convention against
Corruption and the Council of Europe's Civil Law Convention on
Corruption as providing a clearer private right of action for injuries resulting

42 See Rick Suttle, The Advantages of a Large Business, HOUS.
CHRONICLE,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/advantages-large-business-21007.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2017)
(detailing four major advantages of large businesses).
43 See Thomas R. Fox, FCPA Enforcement: What Does it Mean for Non-US Companies?
LEXISNEXIS (Sept. 2012) https://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/intl/en/resources/whitepaper/FCPAEnforcement.pdf (explaining how FCPA acts to promote fairness among large and small
corporations). The FCPA has a broad scope of international enforcement:
The FCPA is enforcement against all US based companies, wherever they operate across
the globe; against all US citizens anywhere in the world; against all foreign subsidiaries
of US companies across the globe; against any foreign company which has a US
subsidiary or which does business in the US; against any company which has
transactions which go through the US banking system; and finally against any foreign
citizen who works for any of the above entities.
Id. at 3.
4 See infra Part IIl.
45 See infra Part IV.
46 See infra Parts V-VI.
47 See Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145, 171 (2d Cir. 2014) ("We conclude that there
is no private right of action under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA .... ).
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from bribery and other corruption.48 The courts, however, are vehement:
there is no implied private action in the FCPA.4 9
The seminal case of Lamb v. Phillip Morris5 o established that the
FCPA does not include a private right of action." In Lamb, American
tobacco manufacturers alleged that the defendant tobacco purchasers
promised donations to several foreign nations in exchange for price controls,
tax deductions, and other benefits related to the importation of foreign
tobacco.S 2 The plaintiffs contended this constituted an illegal restraint on
trade and claimed these donations violated the FCPA.5 3 Affirming the lower
court's dismissal of the FCPA claim, the Sixth Circuit rejected any notion
that a private action can be brought under the FCPA, stating that such an
action "would directly contravene the carefully tailored FCPA scheme
presently in place." 54 The court concluded that Congress did not intend a
private right of action, despite a reference to it in a House report and an early

48 See The United Nations Convention against Corruption, GAN BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION
http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/anti-corruption-legislation/united-nationsPORTAL,
convention-against-corruption (last visited Jan. 25, 2017) (providing overview of United Nations'
legislation to combat global business corruption). Nearly thirty years after the United States
enacted the FCPA, the United Nations created similar legislation:
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the most
comprehensive anti-corruption convention, entering into force in December 2005. It
covers a wide-range of corruption offences, including domestic and foreign bribery,

embezzlement, trading in influence and money laundering. The UNCAC provisions
obligate State Parties to take a number of public and private anti-corruption measures
[including]: .... Prevention.... Criminalisation.... International Recovery..

.

. [and]

Asset Recovery.
Id.
49 See Republic ofIraq, 768 F.3d at 170 (holding Congress did not intend to provide implied
right of private action in FCPA). The Supreme Court did not find an implied right of private action
in the FCPA:

The Cort v. Ash factors also do not support recognition of a private right. The statute's
prohibitions focus on the regulated entities; the FCPA contains no language expressing
solicitude for those who might be victimized by acts of bribery, or for any particular
class of persons. "Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals
protected create no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of
persons."
Id. (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001)).
50 Lamb v. Phillip Morris, 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).
1 See id. at 1029 (concluding FCPA did not include private cause of action).
52 See id. at 1025 (providing background of case).
53 See id. (outlining facts alleged in plaintiffs complaint).
54 See id. at 1029 (describing Sixth Circuit's interpretation of private cause of action and
FCPA).
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Senate version of the act." The court reasoned that allowing a private cause
of action under the FCPA would undermine the law's preference for
compliance by permitting a surge in private FCPA prosecutions.s" However,
due to the high cost of a FCPA violation, shareholders and other private
plaintiffs have continued to seek redress through other, more indirect legal
actions.57
The most common alternative remedy for private plaintiffs
confronted with corrupt business practices is a collateral derivative action.
In a collateral derivative action, shareholders sue the board of directors and
executive officers on behalf of the corporation, as both the injury and remedy
accrue to the corporation instead of the shareholders." As a threshold matter
in derivative actions, the plaintiff must satisfy the demand doctrine by having
a plaintiff shareholder ask the board of directors to file suit on behalf of the
corporation.60 The rationale underlying the demand doctrine is the decision
to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a corporation primarily resides with the board
of directors." Upon demand, the board can, and frequently does, decide that
a lawsuit is not in the best interests of the corporation.62 Critically, this
5 See Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1029-30 (detailing legislative history and lack of congressional intent
to allow private cause of action).
56 See id. (explaining rejection of FCPA and private cause of action).

57 See Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 2014) ("The Republic argues
that Lamb erred in its analysis of the legislative history of the FCPA and that that history suggests
that the reason Congress did not expressly provide for a private right of action was to avoid creating
a 'negative inference' . . . .").
58 See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder
Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 75, 81-83 (2008) (discussing private shareholder litigation
options).
59 See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 353-55 (Del. 1988) (holding shareholders
benefit indirectly due to their share of ownership).
60 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(3)(A)-(B)
(stating derivative actions must be plead with
particularity);
see
also
DEL.
CH.
CT.
R.
23.1(a)
available
at
https://courts.delaware.gov/rules/pdf/ChanceryRuleSetblackline-version7-18-17.pdf
("The
complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the
plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.").
61 See Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. v. Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A., 34 A.3d 1074, 1082
(Del. 2011) (stating demand requirement "allocates, as between directors and shareholders, the
authority to sue on behalf of the corporation.").
62 See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216-17 (Del. 1996) (outlining purpose of demand
requirement). The demand requirement is important:

The demand requirement serves a salutary purpose. First, by requiring exhaustion of
intracorporate remedies, the demand requirement invokes a species of alternative dispute
resolution procedure which might avoid litigation altogether. Second, if litigation is
beneficial, the corporation can control the proceedings. Third, if demand is excused or
wrongfully refused, the stockholder will normally control the proceedings.
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decision not to bring suit is a business decision, which normally is protected
from judicial scrutiny due to the highly deferential nature of the business
judgment rule.63 This presents the plaintiff shareholders with an almost
insurmountable barrier to overcome, effectively shutting down most
derivative suits.64
In derivative suits, the alternative for plaintiffs to make the demand
and face the business judgment rule is to plead that the demand is instead
futile.65 Pleading futility requires the plaintiff show that the majority of
current directors have a substantial personal stake in the issue and could not
have properly exercised their business judgment.6 6 Typically, under the test
articulated in Aronson v. Lewis, the plaintiff must challenge a specific
decision or action by the board of directors in order to establish director
malfeasance.6 7 This creates reasonable doubt that their decision should be
sheltered under the business judgment rule because the directors no longer

The jurisprudence of Aronson and its progeny is designed to create a balanced
environment which will: (1) on the one hand, deter costly, baseless suits by creating a
screening mechanism to eliminate claims where there is only a suspicion expressed
solely in conclusory terms; and (2) on the other hand, permit suit by a stockholder who
is able to articulate particularized facts showing that there is a reasonable doubt either
that (a) a majority of the board is independent for purposes of responding to the demand,
or (b) the underlying transaction is protected by the business judgment rule.
Id.
63 See Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Duties and Fiduciary Outs, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157,
178-80 (2013) (outlining difficulties faced by private plaintiffs in a collateral derivative actions).
6 See id at 178 (demonstrating high standard plaintiffs faced when attempting to prosecute
directors' breach of fiduciary duty). "The drafters of fiduciary outs may ... assume that, because
directors generally will be found to have breached their fiduciary duties only upon a finding of
gross negligence, unfair self-dealing, or intentional misconduct, they cannot be required to avoid
their obligations pursuant to a fiduciary out except under such circumstances." Id.
65 See id at 180 (outlining alternative option for plaintiffs to circumvent business judgment
rule).
66 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (detailing two main requirements
court must make in directors' breach of fiduciary duty cases). The requirements set forth that:

[T]he Court of Chancery must make two inquiries, one into the independence and
disinterestedness of the directors and the other into the substantive nature of the
challenged transaction and the board's approval thereof. As to the latter inquiry the court
does not assume that the transaction is a wrong to the corporation requiring corrective
steps by the board.
Id.
See id at 808 (providing overview of Aronson test to establish board of directors were not
disinterested); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2006) (narrowing the scope of
the Aronson test).
67
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appear disinterested and independent. 6 8 Alternatively, and perhaps more
relevant to the FCPA, if a plaintiff claims that liability should flow from the
inaction of directors, courts rely on a test which examines whether directors
could have responded to the demand using independent business judgment."9
The central premise of a derivative suit is a director inaction claim
first articulated through In re Caremark Int'1 Inc.70 Under Caremark, the
court determined that a claim is rooted in the theory that the directors harmed
the corporation by breaching their oversight duties.71 In this seminal case,
the plaintiffs alleged that the company's "directors breached their duty of
care by failing adequately [sic] to supervise the conduct of Caremark
employees.... thereby exposing [the company] to fines and liability." 7 2
While the Caremark standard initially appeared to be an ideal vehicle for
FCPA derivative litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court limited the scope
of Caremark by holding that directors would be liable only if they have
completely failed to implement any reporting and controls systems, or
willfully failed to monitor the systems. 73 As a result of these high pleading
68 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 (outlining business judgment rule standard). The business
judgement rule states that:
The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of
Delaware directors under Section 14 1(a). It is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
Id. at 812 (citation omitted).
69 See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993) (discussing whether board could
consider merits of demand). The Rales court stated that:
[A] court must determine whether or not the particularized factual allegations of a
derivative stockholder complaint create a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the
complaint is filed, the board of directors could have properly exercised its independent
and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand. Ifthe derivative plaintiff
satisfies this burden, then demand will be excused as futile.
Id. (footnote omitted).
70 698 A.2d 959, 966-67 (Del. Ch. 1996) (outlining principles governing settlements of
derivative claims).
n See id. at 967 (summarizing directors' duties to monitor corporate operations).
72 See id. at 964 (detailing claims facing board of directors alleged in shareholder lawsuit).
n See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (articulating differences between
Caremark and Stone for director liability). The court stated:
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director
oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls,
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from
being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention. In either case, imposition
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standards, a large proportion of derivative suits are dismissed, with only a
few reaching settlement agreements.74
A second option for a private action under the FCPA is a securities
fraud class action suit." These suits specifically target disclosures that the
company makes around the time of the FCPA violation.7 ' FCPA derived
securities class actions advance the theory that deficient internal accounting
systems and misleading statements artificially inflate share prices. 7 This

of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging
their fiduciary obligations. Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act,
thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their
duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.
Id.
74 See Erickson, supra note 58, at 113-16 (outlining shareholder difficulties when filing
derivative suit).
7 See Svetlana Starykh & Stefan Boettrich, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action
Litigation: 2015 Full-Year Review, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING 16 (Jan. 25, 2016),
NER
http://www.nera.com/content/dami/nera/publications/2016/2015_SecuritiesTrendsReport
A.pdf (discussing growth in federal securities class action filings).
76 See Cori A. Lable & Carly Baratt, Courts Continue to Dismiss ShareholderSuits Based on
FCPA
Violations,
ROPES
&
GRAY
(Apr.
1,
2015),
https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2015/April/Courts-Continue-to-DismissShareholder-Suits-Based-on-FCPA-Violations.aspx (discussing procedural hurdles making it
difficult for FCPA-based shareholder lawsuits to succeed). Recognizing the difficulties with FCPA
violations by stating that
The most significant hurdle for plaintiffs has been the demand requirement imposed by
many states, including Delaware and New York, at the motion to dismiss stage. The
demand requirement obliges a plaintiff to ask the board to bring a suit on behalf of the
corporation before filing a derivative suit itself or, alternatively, to plead with
particularity facts showing a demand would have been futile. Because such derivative
suits typically are filed without first making a demand on the board, plaintiffs have been
forced to argue - to little avail - demand futility.
Id. at 2.
7 See 2009 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 4, 2010),
(discussing
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2009Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx
lawsuit filed against Siemens AG). A lawsuit was filed alleging that
Siemens committed securities fraud by knowingly misleading and defrauding investors
through statements and representations that the company would remain highly profitable
after it was compelled to discontinue violations of the FCPA. According to the
complaint, Siemens's officers knew that the company's profitability was dependent on
illegal bribes, but nevertheless told investors in late 2007 and early 2008 that it would
continue to meet publicly announced revenue and earnings projections. These alleged
misrepresentations artificially inflated Siemens's stock price, causing "billions of dollars
in damages" to shareholders.
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effectively grounds the claim in Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.78
Specifically, SEC Rule 10(b)(5) prohibits entities, in connection with a
security transaction from: (i) employing schemes or devices to defraud; (ii)
making material misstatements or omitting the same; and (iii) engaging in
an act or course of business which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person. 79 This places the defendant company in a difficult predicament
by forcing the company to disclose and record improper payments to
preclude elevating an FCPA books and records violation to the level of
securities fraud.so
Although courts have upheld an implied private right of action under
Rule 1 0(b)(5), the right has been substantially confined through the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")." The PSLRA
enhances the pleading threshold in securities class actions, requiring that
plaintiffs plead with particularity and a "strong inference" of scienter.8 2
Nonetheless, plaintiffs have enjoyed a fair amount of success in these types
of suits, often settling for amounts far exceeding the fines imposed by the
DOJ and SEC.
While the court should consider a myriad of factors,

Id See also Bartle ET AL., supranote 27, at 1287 ("plaintiffs have sought recovery on a securities
fraud theory by arguing directors misrepresented information about the corporation's FCPA
violations, settlements with [agencies] or quality of .... internal controls.").
78 See Starykh & Boettrich, supra note 75, at 5 (noting Section 10(b)(5) class actions alleging
insider sales dropped precipitously from 2005 to 2015).
" See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017) (examining limits of security transactions).
80 See Crim. Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Just. & Enforcement Div. of U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, supra note 1, at 41 (explaining not all elements of anti-bribery violation
need to be met to hold company liable). Forcing companies to disclose improper payments has
broad consequences:
Good internal controls can prevent not only FCPA violations, but also other illegal or
unethical conduct by the company, its subsidiaries, and its employees. DOJ and SEC
have repeatedly brought FCPA cases that also involved other types of misconduct, such

as financial fraud, commercial bribery, export controls violations, and embezzlement or
self-dealing by company employees.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
s1 See Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: CollateralShareholderLitigation Following
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Investigations, 73 OHIo ST. L.J. 1217, 1242 (2012) ("Enacted to

curb frivolous class action lawsuits, the PSLRA imposes additional pleading requirements on
securities class action lawsuits, requiring that claims that defendants made false statements be
pleaded with particularity . . . .").
82 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2017) (requiring plaintiffs to use facts giving strong
inference suggesting accused acted with requisite mindset).
8 See Westbrook, supra note 81, at 1246-48 (describing various settlements exceeding DOJ
and SEC penalties).
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typically timing, financial capabilities, and operations of the company play
the most pivotal role in these suits.84

IV. FCPA IN CHINA
Having established the difficulty individual shareholders face when
dealing with options to bring private actions, it is important to examine how
and why the FCPA protects them in an increasingly globalized economy.1 5
With the rise of the Chinese economy, particularly over the past twenty-five
years, corporations face newfound difficulties in negotiations that have
traditionally been conducted in a Western-style manner." Differences in
negotiation styles can lead to poor communication and misunderstanding,

84 See 2011 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBsoN DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (July 11, 2011),
http://gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/201Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.pdf (stating frequent
FCPA violations are result of poor internal accounting controls). Beyond the derivative suit and
securities fraud class action, private plaintiffs have also launched a host of claims in tort,
employment, antitrust, and even under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"). Id. at 13. This Note will not explore these areas in detail, as the suits are highly factspecific and have been far less successful compared to derivative actions and securities fraud
actions. Id.
8 See Crim. Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Just. & Enforcement Div. of U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, supra note 1, at 56 (articulating importance of corporate compliance
program protections in global marketplace). Financial ramifications for violations are costly:
For violations of the anti-bribery provisions, corporations and other business entities are
subject to a civil penalty of up to $16,000 per violation ....
For violations of the
accounting provisions, SEC may obtain a civil penalty not to exceed the greater of (a)
the gross amount of the pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result of the violations or
(b) a specified dollar limitation. The specified dollar limitations are based on the
egregiousness of the violation, ranging from $7,500 to $150,000 for an individual and
$75,000 to $725,000 for a company.
Id. at 69.
86 See Richard Herd & Sean Dougherty, China's Economy: A Remarkable Transformation,
OECD
OBSERVER
(Sept.
2005),
http://oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/1685/China_92seconomy:_A remarkabletra
nsformation.html (expounding on economic challenges presented by China's expansion). The
economic challenges China faces can be explained by
The pace of economic change in China has been extremely rapid since the start of
economic reforms just over 25 years ago. According to official statistics, economic
growth has averaged 9.5% over the past two decades and seems likely to continue at that
pace for some time. National income has been doubling every eight years. Such an
increase in output represents one of the most sustained and rapid economic
transformations seen in the world economy in the past 50 years.
Id
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which causes substandard results for both parties." "Negotiators from
individualist, egalitarian, and low-context-communications cultures, such as
the United States, use direct, confrontational styles, whereas negotiators
from collectivist, hierarchical, and high-context-communications cultures,
such as China, prefer to use indirect negotiation styles that avoid
confrontation.""
In addition to difficulties arising from various negotiation styles, a
component of many nations' cultures involves bribing public officials in
order to successfully operate a business.89 According to Transparency
International, over two-thirds of the 176 countries measured fell below the
midpoint of the 2016 Corruption Perception Index." The United States main
economic rival, China, scored below the median score, ranking seventy-

87 See Raymond Sham, Negotiation Styles: Chinese vs American, RAYMOND SHAM, PC (July
14, 2010, 11:13 PM), http://www.rslawpc.com/law-blog/negotiation-styles-chinese-vs-american
(distinguishing between negotiation styles in China and U.S.). It is important to understand that

China has a long and rich history that has shaped the minds, values, and beliefs of its
people. Face, which refers to a person's reputation, is a crucial factor in Chinese
negotiating style. The importance of guan-xi is founded on the collectivist feature of
Chinese culture, where the welfare of the group is valued higher than the welfare of the
individual. Further, hierarchy is strictly followed. Moreover, the Chinese think in terms
of the whole, so will address all issues in the negotiation simultaneously with no apparent
order, and seemingly not resolving anything. All this consumes a tremendous amount
of time to conclude negotiations with the Chinese. Finally, after signing the contract,
the Chinese will demand more than is stated in the contract.
Id.
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J, SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 10-11 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing differences in negotiation styles between China
and United States). There is a contrast between cultures:
88

Individualist cultures place the interests of the individual above those of the collective;
hierarchical cultures, unlike egalitarian cultures, emphasize differentiated social status
and deference to social superiors and associate social power with social exchanges;
negotiators from low-context communications cultures emphasize direct, explicit
exchanges, whereas those from high-context-communications cultures emphasize
indirect exchanges that must be understood against a complex and unstated background
of social values.
Id.
89 See Richard Levick, New Data:Bribery is Often an 'Unspoken Rule'in China, FORBES (Jan.
21, 2015, 9:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2015/01/21/new-data-bribery-isoften-an-unspoken-rule-in-china ("Companies report the leading reason corrupt payments are
offered as 'competitive pressure."').
90 See CorruptionPerceptionsIndex 2016, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions-index-2016 (examining global
average scores for public sector corruption).
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ninth. 91 Moreover, nearly thirty-five percent of companies operating in
China state that they have to either bribe officials or provide gifts just to
operate. 9 2 Sixty-one percent of firms within China think that corruption is a

significant problem. 93 The FCPA aims to level the playing field by punishing
these practices.94
Since the Qing Dynasty in China, "Red Hat" businessmen have been
closely connected with government officials, often blurring the lines
between entrepreneurs and politicians with familial ties to secure favorable
governmental backing. 95 Consequently, many of these Red Hat officials may
be considered "foreign officials" under the FCPA, which increases the risks
for American companies doing business in China.96 The risks are the highest
9' See id. (noting United States ranked 18th out of 176 nations).
92 See Craig Charney & Shehzad Qazi, Corruptionin China: What CompaniesNeed to Know,
CHARNEY
RESEARCH
1,
1-2
(Jan.
2015),
http://www.chameyresearch.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/White-Paper-Corruption-in-China-FINAL-v1 0.pdf ("Across sectors, real
estate and construction (41%) is the worst hit. More than one-third of the executives in
manufacturing (36%), services (35%) and retail (34%) companies also report the need to make
payoffs or gifts.").
9 See id. at 3 ("Local-level officials, who enjoy the power and regulatory control to help or
make life hell for business in their domains, are also the main beneficiaries of corruption. Of the
execs who said business had to bribe to operate, most (79%) said such payments and gifts were
made to local government officials.").
94 See id (describing systemic problems facing Chinese economy).
9s See Neil Gough & Michael Forsythe, Former ChiefofJPMorgan China Unit is Arrested,
NEW YORK TIMEs (May 21, 2014, 2:23 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/formertop-china-jpmorgan-banker-said-to-be-arrested-in-hong-kong/?r-1
(highlighting recent deals
between employees related to executives in Chinese business). The details of the investigation
indicate that
Mr. Fang, 48, who left JPMorgan in March, has been a focus of a federal bribery
investigation in the United States into whether the bank's "Sons and Daughters" hiring
program violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.... Mr. Fang was one of several
JPMorgan executives whose emails on hiring practices were given to the United States
authorities by the bank. In one of them, he wrote, "You all know I have always been a
big believer of the Sons and Daughters program - it almost has a linear relationship"
with winning jobs to advise Chinese companies.
Id.

96 See Eugene T. Chen & Michael J. Shepard, Who Is a 'ForeignOfficial'in China: The FCPA
After
Noriega and
Carson Cases,
BNA
BLOOMBERG
(May
18,
2012),
https://www.bna.com/foreign-official-in-china/ (identifying foreign official qualification in
China). The authors describe how to determine a foreign official by stating that
In analyzing whether an official in China would qualify as a foreign official under the
FCPA, it is necessary to first determine the type of enterprise with which the individual
is associated. This determination will inform the level of government ownership and
control over the enterprise and hence whether the official is likely to be covered by the
FCPA.
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when dealing with state-owned industries such as oil, steel, and
telecommunications because "the state has the power to appoint the directors
and principals, as well as to approve material decisions such as mergers,
divisions and dissolutions, recapitalization, and the issuance of corporate
bonds."9 7 While the Chinese government did issue an initial notice in 2015
denouncing Red Hat intermediaries, American companies should continue
to monitor the government's next steps to issue further guidelines to clearly
define the presently blurred lines of who can be deemed a "foreign
official."9 8
Troublesome enforcement issues that brand owners have
encountered include demands by authorities for entertainment in the form of
lavish banquets and payment of "case fees." 99 These payments-in some
instances tens of thousands of dollars or more-to Chinese officials are often
0 0 While
passed off as "miscellaneous costs" to the corporate headquarters.
the FCPA does allow for facilitating payments, these grease payments are to
help accelerate "routine governmental action," such as processing papers and
issuing permits. 101 It is important to note the language of the FCPA makes
clear a facilitation payment is not an affirmative defense but an exception to
the general FCPA interdiction against bribery and corruption.' 0 2 Although

Id.
See Yihong Zhang, Compliance Alert: Finding and Dealing with 'RedHats' in China, THE
9
FCPA BLOG (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/10/4/compliance-alert-findingand-dealing-with-red-hats-in-china.html#sthash.kAiXoDT5.dpuf (discussing importance of due
diligence in determining "foreign officials"). See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Six FormerExecutives
of California Valve Company Chargedin $46 million Foreign Bribery Conspiracy,(Apr. 8, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-former-executives-california-valve-company-charged-46million-foreign-bribery-conspiracy ("In the period from 2003 through 2007, the defendants caused
the valve company to pay approximately $4.9 million in bribes, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), to officials of foreign state-owned companies.").
98 See Zhang, supra note 97 (discussing vital role of Red Hats in Chinese society). ("[I]n order
to accurately assess the risks under the FCPA in this situation, companies need to wait for China to
issue more specific guidelines.").
9 See Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 2012 Wis. L. REV. 573,
595 (2012) ("It is well known that private investigation firms often make payments to induce PRC
officials to conduct raids and seizures. These payments are sometimes referred to as 'case fees'
and are often demanded by PRC officials.").
00 See id ("These case fees are sometimes justified as compensating the authorities because
they claim to have limited budgets.").
101 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (2017) (noting exception for routine governmental action). See
also Thomas R. Fox, When Does a Grease Payment Become a Bribe Under the FCPA?, FCPA
COMPLIANCE & ETICS (Feb. 2, 2011), http://fcpacompliancereport.com/2011/02/when-does-agrease-payment-become-a-bribe-under-the-fcpa (addressing test for when grease payments
transition to bribes).
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (2017) (stating facilitation payment is exception and not
affirmative defense); see also When a PaymentBecomes a Bribe, MORGAN & MORGAN (last visited
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no specific monetary limit is listed in the FCPA statute, the frequency and
amount of payments are taken into account by the DOJ, magnifying the need
for proper accounting.103
V. FUTURE FCPA ENFORCEMENT
As Donald Trump has been elected as the 45th United States
President, there is reason to be skeptical about FCPA enforcement going
forward.104 In an interview in 2012, President Trump said "this country is
absolutely crazy" to prosecute alleged FCPA violations in places like
China.0 5 Furthermore, Trump stated that the FCPA is a "horrible law and it
should be changed" because it creates a "huge disadvantage" for American
businesses." Along those same lines, the recent executive order signed by
President Trump designed to significantly reduce regulations could be seen
Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.secwhistleblowerprogram.org/whistleblower-fraud/bribes-vs-payments
(explaining distinction between payments and bribes).
103 See Fox, supranote 101 (identifying factors for when facilitation payments become bribes).
It is difficult to determine when facilitation payments become bribes:
There is no outer limit but there is some line where the perception shifts. If a facilitating
payment is over $100 you are arguing from a point of weakness. The presumption of
good faith is against you. You might be able to persuade the government at an amount
over $100. But anything over this amount and the government may well make further
inquiries. So for instance, the DOJ might say that all facilitation payments should be
accumulated together and this would be a pattern and practice of bribery.
Id. See also U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, SEC Charges BHP Billiton with Violating FCPA at
Olympic Games (May 20, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-93.html (providing
example of FCPA violation due to insufficient accounting). The FCPA violation here is described
as
An SEC investigation found that BHP Billiton failed to devise and maintain sufficient
internal controls over its global hospitality program connected to the company's
sponsorship
of the
2008
Summer
Olympic
Games
in Beijing ....
"Although BHP Billiton put some internal controls in place around its Olympic
hospitality program, the company failed to provide adequate training to its employees
and did not implement procedures to ensure meaningful preparation, review, and
approval of the invitations."
Id The instance is noteworthy for its focus on purely internal documents unrelated to any alleged
bribery or financial reporting problem, not to mention the $25 million penalty. Id.
104 See Mike Koehler, The DonaldGoes Offand Conflates the Issues, FCPA PROFESSOR (May
17, 2012), http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-donald-goes-off-and-conflates-the-issues/ (summarizing
President Trump's negative outlook on FCPA).
1os See id. (quoting President Trump regarding his disfavor of FCPA enforcement).
106 See Mike Koehler, Donald Trump: The FCPA Is a "HorribleLaw and It Should Be
Changed, " FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 6, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/donald-trump-the-fcpa-isa-horrible-law-and-it-should-be-changed/ (outlining President Trump's issues with FCPA).
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as a precursor for reducing government activity and intervention with
regards to the FCPA.10 7
President Trump's nomination for chair of the SEC-one of the
nation's top financial regulating institutions and enforcer of the FCPA-Jay
Clayton, also wants to ease what he considers to be unnecessary regulations
that deter investors and American companies. I In December 2011, Clayton
chaired the Committee on International Business Transactions that
investigated the possibility of minimizing the consequences of the FCPA on
American business. 109 The committee concluded that enforcement of the
See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (addressing President
Trump's plan to prevent executive agencies from creating more regulations). The Executive Order
states: "[lit is important that for every one new regulation issued, at least two prior regulations be
identified for elimination, and that the cost of planned regulations be prudently managed and
controlled through a budgeting process." Id. See also Jacob Pramuk, Trump Tells Business Leaders
He Wants to Cut Regulations by 75% or 'Maybe More', CNBC (Jan. 23, 2017, 11:10 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/23/trump-tells-business-leaders-he-wants-to-cut-regulations-by75-percent-or-maybe-more.html (detailing President Trump's top priority to "cut regulation
massively" by 75% or more).
"os See Chris Flood, 'Bonfire ofRegulations'FearedUnder New SEC Boss, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/9ef7ccee-de5a-I1e6-86ac-f253db7791c6 (providing
background information about new SEC chairman). The new SEC position is described as:
107

Opponents of the new president believe Mr. Clayton's appointment could lead to the
SEC adopting a less aggressive approach to pursuing and prosecuting financial
wrongdoing ..... On the one hand, the Democrats, led by Senator Warren, want the
SEC to push for the completion of Ms. White's regulatory agenda. But Republicans on
the other side of the aisle will push for a bonfire of regulations. Nobody really knows
where this will go," said Mr. Baris [chairman of the investment management practice at
Morrison & Foerster].

Id.
109 See COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, The FCPA and Its Impact
on InternationalBusiness Transactions- Should Anything Be Done to Minimize the Consequences
of the U.S.'s Unique Position on Combating Offshore Corruption? NEW YORK CITY BAR
2011),
(Dec.
23
ASSOCIATION
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAlmpactonlnternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf
(summarizing committee meeting to reevaluate FCPA enforcement). The committee summarized
its position:

Our position is that (1) the competitive landscape of the 21st century global economy
warrants the reevaluation of the United States' strategy in fighting foreign corruption,
(2) the current anti-bribery regime-which tends to place disproportionate burdens on
U.S. regulated companies in international transactions and incentivizes other countries
to take a "lighter touch" -is causing lasting harm to the competitiveness of U.S.
regulated companies and the U.S. capital markets and (3) even putting aside the
disproportionate costs borne by U.S. regulated companies, the continued unilateral and
zealous enforcement of the FCPA by the United States may not be the most effective
means to combat corruption globally-in fact, in some circumstances it may exacerbate
the problem of overseas corruption.
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FCPA is not the most effective strategy to fight foreign corruption and may
outweigh the benefit of global business for the United States.
As Clayton transitions from the private sector to a public servant,
forecasting Clayton's actions may not be as straightforward as simply
expecting him to follow his 2011 paper.110 For example, Mary Jo White,
Clayton's predecessor as SEC chair, was a zealous advocate for her corporate
clients against the SEC and DOJ before spearheading a record-breaking year
of FCPA enforcement in 2016.1" Furthermore, since the release of
Clayton's paper in 2011, the United Kingdom has begun to vigorously
enforce the U.K. Bribery Act-in its nascent stage of development in 2011against global violators. 1 12 Moreover, even countries such as China, India,
and Brazil "have introduced, enacted, or amended anti-bribery and anticorruption laws of their own."113

Perhaps the strongest evidence of Clayton's current view of the
FCPA was discovered when he responded to questions from the U.S.
Banking Committee during his confirmation hearing.1 14 Clayton stated the
FCPA was a "powerful and effective" tool to combat bribery and

Id. at 23.
110 See Daniel R. Alonso, How Clayton's SEC is Likely to View the FCPA, THE FCPA BLOG
(Jan. 19, 2017, 8:52 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/l/19/daniel-r-alonso-howclaytons-sec-is-likely-to-view-the-fcpa.html (predicting SEC's role in FCPA enforcement during
Trump administration).
1' See Richard L. Cassin, The 2016FCPA Enforcement Index, THE FCPA BLOG (Jan. 3, 2017,
8:08
AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/1/3/the-2016-fcpa-enforcement-index.html
(describing large settlements in 2016 due to FCPA enforcement). 2016 was a record-breaking year
for the FCPA:
[2016] was the biggest enforcement year in FCPA history. Both the number of
enforcement actions and the overall amounts paid to resolve them were records. Four
blockbuster FCPA settlements in 2016-Teva Pharmaceutical at $519 million,
Odebrecht / Braskem at $419.8 million, Och-Ziff at $412 million, and VimpelCom at
$397.6 million-landed on our list of the ten biggest FCPA cases of all time.
Id
112 See Alonso, supra note 110 (noting bribery conviction in China and Brazil against large
pharmaceutical company); see also Hester Plumridge & Laurie Burkitt, GlaxoSmithKline Found
Guilty
of
Bribery
in
China,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
19,
2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/glaxosmithkline-found-guilty-of-bribery-in-china-1411114817
(noting largest corporate fine levied in China at $500 million).
113 See Alonso, supra note 110 (outlining new anti-bribery legislation in other large, nonWestern countries).
114 See Andrew Ramonas, SEC Chairman Won't Abandon Anti-Bribery Law, BNA
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.bna.com/sec-chairman-nominee-n57982086171/
(detailing Clayton's responses to Senate Banking Committee regarding FCPA).
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corruption."' Furthermore, he stated that he looks "forward to working with
my fellow Commissioners, Enforcement Division staff, and other authorities
in the U.S. and abroad to coordinate enforcement of the FCPA and other anticorruption laws."' 1 6
While Clayton favors continuing enforcement, as of September 1,
2017, the Trump administration has only brought three FCPA enforcement
actions."' There are a variety of explanations for the decline in prosecutions,
with the strongest being the renewal of the Pilot Program has encouraged
companies to voluntarily self-disclose FCPA violations to the DOJ."
However, the Pilot Program is only enforced by the DOJ, and does not
explain SEC inaction." 9
If the Trump administration intends to pursue this path of FCPA
enforcement, taxpayer costs will be reduced by bringing fewer lawsuits
because companies will be incentivized to invest time and money in
compliance procedures designed to weed out corruption.1 20 Moreover, the

"'

See COMMITEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS: NOMINATION OF JAY

CLAYTON, 115th Cong. (Mar. 23, 2017), http://src.bna.com/nBm (responding to question inquiring
about specific plan for enforcement of FCPA). "Bribery and corruption have no place in society.
Moreover, they often go hand-in-hand with many other societal ills, including inequality and
poverty, and have anti-competitive effects, including disadvantaging honest businesses.
Accordingly, combating corruption is an important governmental mission." Id at 9.
116 See id. (explaining plan to enforce FCPA).
117 See Steven M. Witzel & Arthur Kutoroff, FCPA Standstill, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 6, 2017),
with
(contrasting
http://www.newyorklawjoumnal.com/id=1202797372471/FCPA-Standstill
Obama Administration which brought 24 FCPA actions by September 1, 2016).
See id. (mentioning two incidents and response by Pilot Program enforced by DOJ). The
"
Pilot Program could explain the decline in prosecutions:
Since the inauguration of President Trump, the DOJ has announced two additional
declinations under the Pilot Program. First, in June 2017, the DOJ closed its
investigation into Linde North America energy companies that bribed government
officials at a company affiliated with the Republic of Georgia. Second, also in June
2017, the DOJ closed its investigation into CDM Smith, a construction and engineering
firm that bribed government officials in India. The embrace of the Pilot Program, in
contrast to aggressive FCPA enforcement proceedings, allows for an increased emphasis
and symbiosis on cooperation between the DOJ and self-reporting companies.
Id
119 See id. (discussing decline in prosecutions aligns with Trump administration's pro-business
stance).
120 See id. (positing future enforcement will be easier due to vigor of prior enforcement
actions); see also Marc Alain Bohn & James G. Tillen, Evaluating FCPA Pilot Program:
2017),
10,
(Apr.
360
LAW
Rise,
the
on
Declinations
https://www.1aw360.com/articles/905127/evaluating-fcpa-pilot-program-declinations-on-the-rise
(commenting on lack of DOJ's public disclosure of declination decisions). Noting a lack of
declination decisions by stating:
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SEC Whistleblower Program incentivizes citizens to step forward and
produce evidence leading to an enforcement action by providing a financial
reward that is unlikely to decline in value.12 1 Nonetheless, the DOJ and SEC
must continue to bring enforcement proceedings or risk losing its credibility
122
and reverse decades of progress created by the FCPA.
Congress could possibly amend the FCPA, as the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce has advocated for "(1) greater clarity regarding the scope and
coverage of the law; and (2) institutionalizing credit to be given to companies
that maintain well-functioning compliance programs.,"123 Indeed, Congress
could introduce an affirmative defense for effective anti-corruption
compliance measures by suggesting a company provide evidence of effective
procedures to prevent bribery and charge the individual employee rather than
the corporation. 12 4 This defense would mirror the provisions found in the
U.K. Bribery Act. 125 While the FCPA and its British counterpart differ in

In support ofthis statement, we have identified 15 instances since April 5, 2016, in which
the DOJ has reportedly closed an FCPA investigation without enforcement in addition
The lack of
to the five publicly disclosed declinations previously mentioned.
information surrounding the closure of these investigations, however, can make it
difficult to compare how they might differ factually from matters the DOJ has either
decided to pursue or publicly declined to prosecute. For instance, while the closure of
an FCPA investigation could be in recognition of a company's self-reporting,
cooperation and/or remediation, it might also reflect insufficient evidence, the absence
of jurisdiction, or a lack of actionable misconduct from a criminal perspective.
Id.
121 See Jason Zuckerman, SEC Awards for Disclosures of Foreign Bribery or FCPA
Violations, THE NAT'L L. REV. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-awardsdisclosures-foreign-bribery-or-fcpa-violations (describing incentive to businesses through SEC
Whistleblower Program). "Under the SEC Whistleblower Program, the SEC Whistleblower Office
will issue awards to whistleblowers who provide original information that leads to enforcement
actions with sanctions in excess of $1 million. A whistleblower is eligible to receive an award of
between 10-30 percent of the total sanctions imposed." Id
122 See Witzel & Kutoroff, supra note 117 (noting decline in bribery and corruption not

immediate but gradual).
123 See Gregory Husisian, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and New Trump Administration:
Your Top Ten Questions Answered, THE NAT'L L. REV. (May 10, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-and-new-trumpadministration-your-top-ten-questions (discussing realistic options for modifying FCPA through
congressional action).
124 See Mike Koehler, Amendments To Simplify The FCPA For U.S. Businesses, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Sept. 24, 2012), http://fcpaprofessor.com/amendments-to-simplify-the-fcpa-for-u-sbusinesses/ (noting six changes that would reduce confusion about FCPA).
(U.K.)
7(l)(a)(b)
§
23
c.
2010,
Act,
Bribery
125 See
penalties
(providing
en.pdf
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/pdfs/ukpga_20100023
for failure of commercial organizations to prevent bribery). Penalties for failure of commercial
organization to prevent bribery include:
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many ways, the mere existence of anti-bribery legislation in both modernized
economies serves as a much stronger deterrent against white collar crime. 12 6
VI. CONCLUSION
As the number of countries who have passed anti-bribery legislation
continues to grow, it has become increasingly clear that the FCPA was
created ahead of its time. Enacted during a turbulent period of American
history to restore both public and global faith in the United States' ability to
maintain its central position in the world's economy, the FCPA
revolutionized conduct in international business. At its inception, many
countries, including China and Russia, were not members of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), which caused wide variety in country-to-country
dealings. However, the WTO standardized pricing and tariffs across a
multitude of industries, resulting in a greater demand for uniformity in
business relations throughout the world.
While reducing the nefarious aspects of corporate transactions,
properly managed companies will benefit throughout the world, particularly
in countries like the United States and in Western Europe where the business

A relevant commercial organisation ("C") is guilty of an offence under this section if a
person ("A") associated with C bribes another person intending-(a) to obtain or retain
business for C, or (b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for C.
(2) But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate procedures designed
to prevent persons associated with C from undertaking such conduct.
Id.

See

also

The

Bribery

Act,

TRANSPARENCY

INTERNATIONAL

UK,

http://www.transparency.org.uk/our-work/business-integrity/bribery-act/ (last visited Sept. 28,
2017) (summarizing positive effects of Bribery Act in United Kingdom). The Bribery Act in the
United Kingdom has been described as:
The Bribery Act is legislation of great significance for companies incorporated in or
carrying on business in the UK. It presents heightened liability risks for companies,
directors and individuals. To avoid corporate liability for bribery, companies must make
sure that they have strong, up-to-date and effective anti-bribery policies and systems.
Id.
126 See Gordon Belch, An Analysis of the Efficacy of the Bribery Act 2010, 5 ABERDEEN
STUDENT L. REv. 134, 146 (2014) (summarizing United Kingdom's approach to combat white
collar crime). The United Kingdom's approach has been described as:
The UKBA 2010 does indeed have enormous potential, but its practical effects have yet
to be exemplified. It is plainly apparent that the UK is taking rigorous action against
corruption by implementing a zero-tolerance approach on white-collar crime, however
Parliament's aspiration of ending bribery in the UK will take time.
Id.
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regulations are more stringent. Although FCPA enforcement varies between
presidential administrations, the overall merits of this legislation continue to
prosper. Different cultures have particular ways of conducting business, and
the mere passage of legislation will not cause back room dealings and illicit
Indeed, "[i]n the absence of global
practices to vanish overnight.
harmonization of anti-bribery and corruption law and its enforcement, the
landscape will remain confused and uneven. One man's bribe is another
man's gift." 27 The FCPA has helped combat global corruption and has made
consistent strides over its forty years of existence to maintain the business
practices and reputation of American companies, which ultimately allows
the United States to lead by example in international affairs.
ChristopherJ. Schlauch

See Dan Hyde, Bribery Act: facilitationpayments,'LAW SOC'y GAZETTE (June 13, 2013),
https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice-points/bribery-act-facilitation-payments/71372.article
(articulating need for anti-bribery law enforcement).
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